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Abstract  
By combining two large data sets (on international trade flows and cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions – M&As), we test two implications of Neary’s (2003, 2007) 
general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model (incorporating strategic interaction 
between firms in a general equilibrium setting). In terms of economic importance, the 
dominant merger wave variable is a positive global-all effect, indicating that M&A 
waves are an economy-wide, global phenomenon. Country-specific merger wave 
variables are of secundary importance. In accordance with the bilateral GOLE model 
as specified by Neary, we find strong evidence that acquiring firms operate in strong 
sectors. However, we also find (less pronounced) evidence that target firms are active 
in strong, not weak sectors, which we label the ‘target paradox’. We show how a 
multi-country extension of the GOLE model that allows for firm heterogeneity can 
explain this target paradox.  
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1 Introduction  
Cross border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are a main vehicle for foreign direct 
investment (see Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, and Table 1 below; Evenett, 
2004 provides a survey). Yet despite its quantitative importance, the determinants of 
cross-border M&As are still not well-understood. Following Neary (2007) various 
motives for M&As can be distinguished in general. In the Industrial Organization (IO) 
literature two basic motives stand out: an efficiency motive and a strategic motive. 
Efficiency gains arise because M&As increase synergy between firms through 
increased use of economies of scale or scope. Furthermore, from a strategic 
perspective M&As might change the market structure and as such have an impact on 
firm profits, which might even be reduced to zero (this is the so-called ‘merger 
paradox’, Salant et al., 1983).2  
 
Kuemmerle (1999) analyzes FDI in R&D for the pharmaceutical and electronics 
sectors with respect to exploiting existing or building up new firm-specific 
advantages. Hejazi and Safarian (1999) consider the role of trade and FDI as diffusion 
channels for total factor productivity growth and conclude that FDI is likely to be 
more important. The role of cultural distance, based on the Kogut and Singh (1988) 
index compiled from the Hofstede (1980) cultural dimensions, on FDI flows has been 
frequently analyzed, see Shenkar (2001) for an overview and critical discussion and 
Garita and van Marrewijk (2008) for a more comprehensive modern approach for 
M&As. Reuer, Shenkar, and Ragozzino (2004) analyze the sector-specific contractual 
heterogeneity of cross-border M&As to mitigate the problem of adverse selection, 
while Björkman, Stahl, and Vaara (2007) discuss the role of cultural differences on 
capability transfer for cross-border acquisitions. Dikova and van Witteloostuijn 
(2007) analyze the influence of institutions on entry and establishment mode choices 
in transition countries. Of particular interest for our study is Bertrand and Zitouna’s 
(2006) partial equilibrium Cournot analysis of differences in technology (and thus 
production costs) on incentives to merge in relation to fixed costs. They find that for 
                                                 
2 This result can be understood as follows. In a symmetric Cournot setting a merger initially increases 
industry concentration and therefore industry profits (the merging firms tend to reduce output in order 
to increase profits). In a Cournot setting, however, other firms react by increasing output, which harms 
the firms involved in the merger with the result that, in the benchmark case of Salant et al (1983), the 
induced expansion of output by the uninvolved firms is sufficient to reduce the profits of the acquiring 
firm. As usual, strategic outcomes depend on the type of strategic interaction, form of demand 
schedules, and of the type of game that is played (see Neary, 2004).  
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high firm-level fixed costs the high-technology firm will take over the low-technology 
firm for low enough costs of firms’ integration. For low and high technology gaps 
there is an inverted U-shaped relation between trade costs and incentives to merge. 
For medium technology gaps this is inverted W-shaped.  
 
The problem with these explanations is that they are based on partial equilibrium 
models and usually do not deal explicitly with cross-border M&As. The partial 
modeling of M&As provides a fundamental, but also a limited understanding of this 
form of takeover, as cross-border mergers are most likely related to economy-wide 
shocks such as economic integration, changes in the legal and regulatory environment, 
or possible asymmetric business cycles. Factors like these change the position of one 
country relative to another, and point in the direction of standard trade theories rather 
than to the more partial oriented IO models. The standard general equilibrium trade 
theories, however, are not well equipped to explain M&As because these theories 
mostly combine no barriers to entry and the absence of strategic interaction which 
effectively precludes the analysis of M&As. This not only holds for the neo-classical 
perfect competition trade models, but also for the models based on increasing returns 
to scale and monopolistic competition. The latter is forcefully brought forward by 
Neary (2004, 2007), but also by the founding fathers of the second monopolistic 
competition revolution themselves, see Dixit (2004) and Stiglitz (2004).  
 
The model developed by Neary (2003, 2007) combines general equilibrium trade 
theory with imperfect markets and strategic behavior between firms. This is difficult, 
because pricing decisions of large firms not only directly affect profits, but their 
market (pricing) behavior also affects national income and the real income of their 
customers. Furthermore, large firms could also influence factor prices. Neary’s (2003) 
General Oligopolistic Equilibrium (GOLE) model avoids some of the standard pitfalls 
of modeling oligopolistic markets by assuming that firms are large in their own 
markets but small in the economy as whole and by simultaneously allowing for 
strategic interaction between firms. Thus firms do not have to calculate the full 
general equilibrium of the whole economy. For our present purposes it is interesting 
that cross-border M&As can occur in this model, and that one can derive testable 
hypotheses on cross-border M&As in relation to comparative advantage. Firms that 
have a comparative (cost) advantage have an incentive to merge with or acquire other 
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firms. If these (sector-specific) cost differences are economy-wide, the model explains 
cross-border M&As. Furthermore, the model also explains the well-established 
stylized fact that M&As come in waves. An initial M&A makes the next one more 
attractive (in terms of firm profitability) which leads to M&A waves.  
 
The aim of our paper is to test two implications of the Neary model (and thus not the 
model itself), in particular whether (i) comparative advantage helps to explain the 
direction of individual cross-border M&As and (ii) M&A waves are an important 
determinant of individual cross-border M&As. The second implication is not unique 
to the Neary model and has been a subject of frequent study, see the discussion below 
and in section 3. The first implication is also supported by Bertrand and Zitouna’s 
(2006) partial equilibrium approach.  
 
To test the two implications, we combine two large data sets: the bilateral trade data 
compiled by Feenstra et al. (2005) and the global mergers and acquisitions database of 
Thomson Financial Securities Data. The trade data allow us to identify country- and 
sector-specific measures of revealed comparative advantage using the Balassa index. 
This index measures the share of a sector’s exports in the overall country-wide 
exports, compared to the share of that sector’s export in the total exports of a group of 
reference countries (Balassa, 1989). The Thomson data give us for the period 1980-
2005 firm-specific data on cross-border M&As. To test our main hypotheses, which 
will be further (sub-) classified below, we take as our M&A sample all cross-border 
M&As to and from Australia, France, USA, UK and the Netherlands. This selection 
was based on cross-border M&A activity, geographical spread, and variety in country 
size. Though the two main hypotheses (i) and (ii) above are key features of the Neary 
model, we want to stress that we neither claim to test all implications of the model nor 
do we claim that the two hypotheses are necessarily unique to the Neary model. As to 
the former, we do not look into the model’s implication that firm profitability 
increases after the M&A takes place. As to the latter, our paper is not the first to test 
for merger waves. However, the combination of the two hypotheses captures the 
essence of Neary‘s GOLE model, and to our knowledge the present paper is the first 
attempt to test for these key implications.       
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Our main new findings are as follows: (i) in terms of economic importance, the 
dominant merger wave variable is a positive global-all effect (indicating that M&A 
waves are an economy-wide, global phenomenon), (ii) country-specific merger wave 
variables are of secundary economic importance, (iii) in accordance with the bilateral 
GOLE model we find evidence that acquiring firms operate in strong sectors, (iv) in 
contrast to the bilateral GOLE model we also find (less pronounced) evidence that 
target firms are active in strong sectors (‘target paradox’), and (v) we show that a 
multi-country extension of the GOLE model allowing for firm heterogeneity can 
explain the target paradox.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes some stylized facts on 
cross-border M&As. Section 3 summarizes the model developed by Peter Neary and 
highlights the two main hypotheses, divided into 6 sub-hypotheses to be tested in this 
paper. Section 4 introduces and discusses the two data sets. Section 5 discusses the 
estimation procedure. Sction 6 presents our main empirical findings. Section 7 
explains the target paradox. Section 8 discusses the robustness of our results, while 
section 9, finally, summarizes and concludes.  
 
2 Cross-border mergers and acquisitions: some facts 
Table 1 shows that cross-border M&As constitute a main vehicle for FDI, especially 
for FDI flows to developed countries. Also, if one looks at cross-border M&As as a 
share of total M&A activity, it is clear that cross-border M&As are quite important. 
During, for instance, the period 1987-1999, which captures most of the so-called 4th 
and 5th merger wave, cross-border M&As, on average, made up for about 25-30% of 
total M&A activity in terms of both the value and the number of the transactions 
(Schenk, 2002). As Table 1 suggests, cross-border M&As are particularly relevant 
within the group of developed countries. OECD data show that, measured as a share 
of their national GDP, the UK and the Netherlands, followed by Germany and France, 
are the leading countries in cross-border M&As. Firms from these countries are most 
active in acquiring (stakes in) firms in other countries. At the peak of the 5th merger 
wave in the late 1990s, for instance, cross-border M&As (as a percentage of GDP) 
were 16.3% in the UK and 13.7% in the Netherlands.  
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Table 1 Cross-border M&A investments (percent of FDI inflows to the host countries) 
 1987-91 1992-94 1995-97 1998-2001 
World 66.29 44.75 60.18 76.23 
Developed countries 77.49 64.93 85.39 88.96 
Developing and transition economies 21.94 15.49 25.79 35.74 
Source: Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004, p.10). 
 
To date, the best and most extensive data source for M&As is the Global Mergers and 
Acquisitions database of Thomson Financial Securities Data (Thomson, hereafter). 
Thomson gathers information on M&As exceeding 1 million US dollar. Its main 
sources of information are financial newspapers and specialized agencies like 
Bloomberg and Reuters. Our Thomson data set begins in 1979 and ends in April 
2005. It should be kept in mind that until the mid-1980s Thomson focused very much 
on M&As for the USA only, and it is only for about the last 20 years that (systematic) 
M&A data gathering took place for other (developed) countries. For more information 
on the specifics of the Thomson data set we used for our analysis, see section 4.  
 
Gugler, et al. (2003) use the Thomson M&A data base for the period 1981-1998 and 
provide the summary statistics on which Table 2 is based. For each country (group) 
Table 2 gives the number of M&A deals, the average deal value (in millions of US $) 
and the percentage of cross-border M&As. The table illustrates the dominant position 
of the USA in terms of the number of M&A deals (which is partly a reflection of the 
initial US-bias in the Thomson data set). At the same time it is clear that for cross-
border M&As, continental Europe and the UK outstrip the USA. The relatively high 
share of cross-border M&As in Europe reflects the fact that the process of European 
economic integration has stimulated cross-border M&A activity. The relative 
importance of cross-border M&A is even larger for Japan, but the overall number of 
deals is rather low. Gugler et al. (2003) also show for their sample that on average the 
profit rate of the acquiring firm is higher than for the target firm (which can be 
interpreted as evidence for productivity differences). The main point is that cross-
border M&As make up a large part of total M&A activity. A similar conclusion is 
reached by Rossi and Volpin (2004), who use the cross-border M&A ratio, the 
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percentage of completed M&A deals in which the acquirer is from a different country 
than the target. For their sample of 49 countries (based on the Thomson data set), the 
cross-border ratio is on average about 43 percent. See Brakman, Garretsen, and van 
Marrewijk (2007) for a recent empirical overview of cross-border M&As. 
 
Table 2 Summary statistics on M&As for selected countries, 1981-1998 
 Number of deals 
(thousands) 
Average deal value 
(million US $) 
Percent  
cross-border 
USA 21.148 246.7 10.6 
UK 4.717 158.3 29.9 
Continental Europe 9.595 285.9 33.5 
Japan 0.646 464.9 52.6 
Australia / New 
Zealand / Canada 
3.232 156.0 30.0 
Rest of the World 5.262 128.3 28.5 
Source: Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2003), p. 633-634 
            
Finally, there is one important stylized fact as to the development of M&A activity 
over time: they come in waves. It is common to distinguish between five merger 
waves during the 20th century, three of which are recent (Andrade, et al., 2001). The 
3rd wave took place in the late 1960-early 1970s, the 4th wave ran from about the mid 
1980s until 1990, and the 5th wave started around 1995 and ended in 2000 with the 
collapse of the “New Economy” and it seems that right now a 6th wave is in the 
making. Merger waves are very much (positively) correlated with increases in share 
prices and p/e ratios and with the overall business cycle in general. When one sticks to 
standard M&A motives, like the efficiency argument, it is rather difficult to explain 
the synchronicity of M&As. Interestingly, Gugler, et al. (2004) find that merger 
waves can be understood if one acknowledges that M&As do not boost efficiency and 
hence do not increase shareholders’ wealth, but instead find that M&A waves are best 
looked upon as the result of overvalued shares and managerial discretion. In section 4 
we will see if M&A waves are also present in the data when one only looks at cross-
border M&As. For the case of the USA and restricting their sample to firms that are 
publicly traded, Andrade et al. (2001) show that with each merger wave the value of 
the M&A deals (measured by firms’ market capitalization) increases strongly. Merger 
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waves in Europe seem to follow those in the USA with a short lag, and until the most 
recent (completed) merger wave, the number and value of M&A deals during these 
waves fell short compared to those in the US counterpart. But during the 5th merger 
wave, European firms engaged in a number of (mega) M&As with the cross-border 
take-over of Mannesmann (Germany) by Vodafone (UK) for 172 billion US$ in 2000 
as to date the largest M&A in Europe.  These facts are clearly interesting, but they do 
not tell us much about the motives for M&As. The next section therefore presents a 
model that explains cross-border M&As.  
 
3 A model of mergers and acquisitions: GOLE 
In this section we give a brief summary of the general oligopolistic equilibrium 
(GOLE) model and formulate the central hypotheses that we will test.3 We distinguish 
between two countries: Home and Foreign, where an asterisk denotes Foreign 
variables when appropriate. Suppose there is a continuum of sectors indexed by 
]1,0[∈z  in which there are by assumption n domestic firms with unit costs )(zc  and  
n* foreign firms with unit costs )(* zc  that engage in Cournot competition.4 
Consumers maximize preferences subject to a budget constraint, see equation (1), 
where U  is utility, I  is income, )(zp  is the price of good z , and )(zx  is the demand 
for good z . If we let λ  denote the marginal utility of income (the Lagrange 
multiplier), then )]()[/1()( zxbazp −= λ  gives the demand for good z  in Home. The 
quadratic specification allows perfect aggregation over different countries, so the 
simple total demand function is given in (2), where )(*)()( zxzxzx +≡ , 
*)/(*)( λλ ++≡ aaa , and *)/( λλ +≡ bb . Note that firms are large in their own 
sector, where they behave strategically, but small relative to the economy as a whole.  
 
(1) [ ]∫ −= 1
0
2)()2/1()(max dzzxbzxaU ; s.t. ∫ ≤1
0
)()( Idzzxzp  
(2) )()( zxbazp −=   
 
                                                 
3 A complete description and derivation of the model is given in Neary (2003, 2007). 
4 For now we take the unit costs as given, but they are determined in general equilibrium. There are no 
fixed costs of production as these provide a well-known incentive for M&As, see Bertrand and Zitouna 
(2006) 
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The first order condition for profit maximization for a firm active in sector z is equal 
to: )()()( zybzczp =− , where )(zy  is the firm’s supply. From this it follows directly 
that the firm’s profits, π  say, are proportional to the square of output 2)(zyb=π .  In 
equilibrium, the output for domestic and foreign firms will depend on the number of 
competitors, the unit costs, and the parameters. Using the first order conditions and 
equating total supply and demand in the market we can determine a firm’s output:5 
(3) 
)1*(
*)(*))(1*(),*,,*,( ++
−−−+=
nnb
cancanbaccnny   
 
Figure 1. Comparative advantage and production 
c*a/(n+1)
a/(n*+1)
c
a
a
F: foreign production only
H: home production onlyHF: both home and 
foreign 
production
O: no production
z = 1
z = 0
 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the situation in a two country setting for all markets. The axes 
depict marginal costs in both countries. From (3) we see that domestic firms have a 
positive output level only if their costs are below a weighted average of the demand 
intercept and the foreign firm’s costs: *)1( 00 cac ξξ −+< , with *)1/(10 n+≡ξ . This 
condition divides the cost area in Figure 1 in four regions. If costs are too high for 
both firms, there is no production (area O). If domestic costs are much higher than 
foreign costs, only foreign firms will produce (area F). If foreign costs are much 
higher than domestic costs, only domestic firms will produce (area H). If domestic 
                                                 
5 Similarly for a foreign firm. 
M&As: waves and comparative advantage 
© Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk, 2008 9
and foreign costs are neither too high nor too different, both domestic and foreign 
firms will produce (area HF). Comparative advantage is most easily incorporated 
using a Ricardian model based on Dornbusch et al. (1977). If labor is the only input 
and )(zα  is the unit labor requirement in sector z , unit costs are simply given by 
)()( zwzc α= , where w  is the wage rate. If we now rank the sectors such that the 
Home country is efficient in sectors with a low value of z , as indicated by the zz -line 
in Figure 1, the domestic firms will be the only producers for low values of z , both 
countries will be active for intermediate values of z , and the foreign firms will be the 
only producers for high values of z .6 The cut-off values will be determined in general 
equilibrium by the labor market clearing conditions. Note in particular that the zz -line 
will shift in response to changes in the wage rates.  
 
We can now analyze the profitability of mergers and acquisitions within this model. 
Let “1” and “0” indicate the post- and pre-merger situation, respectively. Then the 
gain of taking over a Home firm, HG  say, for a foreign firm is given by: 
(4) [ ] 0.)*,(.)*,(.)*,1( 0*0*1 >−−−= nnnnnnGH πππ  
 
The first term (in square brackets) relates to the gain in profitability from reduced 
competition by taking over the domestic firm. The second term indicates the cost of 
acquiring the domestic firm, equal to compensating the owners for their profit loss. 
Since the cost of acquiring the domestic firm is small if this firm has high costs, 
leading to a low output and profit level (see equation 3), it pays to take over a 
domestic firm if you have a cost advantage. On the other hand, the cost advantage 
should not be too big, because otherwise there are no active foreign firms to take over. 
Neary (2007) therefore shows that M&As take place at the borders of the FH area in 
Figure 1, enlarging the areas in which only domestic or only foreign firms are active.  
                                                 
6 Note that the zz-line could be a curve instead of a line, but this is not material to our discussion. 
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Figure 2 Comparative advantage and M&As 
c*
c
a
a
F: foreign production only
H: home production only
HF: both 
home and 
foreign 
production
O: no production
M&A by 
F firms
M&A by 
H firms
z = 1
z = 0
zz0
zz1
  
 
It turns out that (4) holds if domestic costs are above a weighted average of the 
demand intercept and the foreign costs: *)1( 11 cac ξξ −+> , with 010 ξξ << .7 This 
determines the shaded areas in Figure 2 where it is profitable to take over other firms, 
namely if strong firms take over weaker firms. For ease of exposition the general 
equilibrium consequences of allowing for M&As are illustrated for two symmetric 
countries in Figure 2. The 0zz  line indicates the distribution of costs and sectors at the 
initial trade equilibrium, before M&As are possible. Once these are allowed, the 
M&As cause profits to increase and the demand for labor and the wage rate to fall. 
This leads to the inward shift of the zz  curve from 0zz  to 1zz . Evidently, this general 
equilibrium effect influences the range of firms actually taken over and the 
distribution of sectors specializing either completely or incompletely, but it does not 
change any of the main implications of the model.  
 
This completes the summary of the model. We now turn to our hypotheses. As we 
explained in the introduction, weak and strong firms will be identified at the country-
sector level by the well-known notion of revealed comparative advantage as 
                                                 
7 [ ] [ ][ ] *;)1)(1*(2 )1(*)1(2)1)(1*(2 2
22
1 nnNNnnN
NnNnNnnN +≡−++
−++−−++≡ξ , see Neary (2007). 
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frequently used in the empirical international trade literature. This leads to the 
following first two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1-A  
Acquiring firms operate in sectors with a high revealed comparative advantage (as 
measured by the Balassa index).  
Hypothesis 1-B  
Target firms operate in sectors with a low revealed comparative advantage (as 
measured by the Balassa index). 
 
These two hypotheses, based on the GOLE model outlined above, have not been 
tested before and lie at the heart of the GOLE model. Our other hypotheses involve 
the phenomenon of mergers waves, which is already well-established empirically see 
for example Evenett (2004). There are alternative theoretical explanations for this 
phenomenon, see for example Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2005) who argue that a 
technological or regulatory change can induce a preemptive wave of defensive 
acquisitions.8 Within the Neary framework, the crucial point to note regarding 
equation (4) on the profitability of M&As is: (i) that non-participating firms also 
benefit from the takeover through a reduction of competition, and (ii) an M&A 
increases the profitability, and thus attractiveness, of the next M&A. This leads to a 
‘wait and see’ or ‘after you’ effect which Neary, using a game-theoretic setting, 
translates into a theory of merger waves. Even though we are thus not the first to look 
into the empirics of merger waves, the testing for M&A waves is relevant for two 
main reasons. The first one is that in conjunction with hypotheses 1-A,B the testing 
for merger waves provides a stronger test of the underlying model. The second reason  
is that the detailed structure of our data allows us to be more specific than related 
work about the characteristics of the merger waves, since we can identify the number 
of M&As in the past one or two years at the sector level for all countries (Hypothesis 
2-A below), at the aggregate level for all countries (Hypothesis 2-B below), at the 
sector level for the acquiring or target country itself ((Hypothesis 2-C below), and, 
                                                 
8 Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) argue that M&As may reduce profits if being an ‘insider’ is better 
than being an ‘outsider’. In general, they show the difficulty of accurately predicting M&A 
profitability. 
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finally, at the aggregate level for the acquiring or target country (Hypothesis 2-D 
below). It shoudl be noted that Neary focuses on global waves.  
 
Hypothesis 2-A 
Mergers and acquisitions come in global, sector-specific waves 
Hypothesis 2-B 
Mergers and acquisitions come in global waves for all sectors 
Hypothesis 2-C 
Mergers and acquisitions come in country- and sector-specific waves 
Hypothesis 2-D 
Mergers and acquisitions come in country-specific waves for all sectors 
 
4  Cross-border M&A data and trade data    
4.1 M&A characteristics 
The Thomson data set allows us to analyze cross-border M&As for a large range of 
countries and years. After some preliminary investigations, we decided to restrict our 
analysis to cross-border merger deals in the period 1980 – early 2005 for five of the 
most active countries, varying in size and geographic location, namely Australia 
(AUS), France (FRA), the Netherlands (NLD), the United Kingdom (GBR), and the 
United States (USA), see also section 2.9 This resulted in 11,721 observations, or 
about 28.5 per cent of all cross border M&As, as summarized in Table 3. The USA 
was the most active country (40.3 percent of the acquisitions and 43.7 percent of the 
targets), closely followed by the UK (39.5 and 27.6 percent, respectively). Note that 
cross-border M&As with acquirer and target located in the same country are possible, 
for example when an American firm takes over another American firm that is active 
abroad.10 Our main analysis includes these within-country cross-border M&As as 
classified by Thomson and show in section 8.2 that our results are robust if these 
observations are excluded from the data.11 
                                                 
9 At this stage we included all cross border M&As with a value above $1 million between January 1st 
1979 and April 4th 2005 where the acquirer and target were located in one of the countries above. For 
this period the Thomson data set gives a total of 159,791 completed M&A deals. Of these deals a total 
of 41,106 are cross-border M&As. Restricting the cross-border M&As for both acquirer and target firm 
to the USA, UK, The Netherlands, Australia, and France finally gives the 11,721 observations on cross-
border M&As used in our analysis. 
10 The majority of within-country M&As is not classified as cross-border by Thomson, so not included. 
11 The obvious drawback of this restriction is that it reduces the number of observations, see also sub-
section 6.3 wich focuses on horizontal M&As only.  . 
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Table 3  Overview of mergers and acquisitions; all sectors, 1980-2005 
  Acquirer  
 AUS FRA USA GBR NLD Sum 
# of M&As       
Target AUS 562 23 388 351 26 1,350 
 FRA 14 223 425 608 74 1,344 
 USA 231 310 2,136 2,229 213 5,119 
 GBR 137 249 1,602 1,095 154 3,237 
 NLD 13 52 178 351 77 671 
 Sum 957 857 4,729 4,634 544 11,721 
per cent       
 AUS 4.8 0.2 3.3 3.0 0.2 11.5 
 FRA 0.1 1.9 3.6 5.2 0.6 11.5 
 USA 2.0 2.6 18.2 19.0 1.8 43.7 
 GBR 1.2 2.1 13.7 9.3 1.3 27.6 
 NLD 0.1 0.4 1.5 3.0 0.7 5.7 
 Sum 8.2 7.3 40.3 39.5 4.6 100 
Horizontal M&As (2-digit sic level): 5,628 (48.0%) 
100 % acquired in M&A 8,487 (72.4%) 
100 % owned after M&A 9,007 (76.8%) 
Value of transaction (million $): mean 186.17 
    median 20.00 
    maximum 60,286.67 
 
About 48 per cent of cross-border M&As can be classified as horizontal M&As at the 
2-digit level where we define a horizontal M&A as an M&A where the acquiring and 
target firm belong to the same 2-digit sector. This classification has its obvious 
limitations as it assumes an SIC2 industry can be looked upon as a sector. Our main 
analysis includes all cross-border M&As. Since the Neary model focuses on 
horizontal M&As we show in section 8.1 that our results are robust if only horizontal 
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M&As are included. 12  In most cases the M&A is a complete takeover (72.4 percent) 
or results in a complete takeover (76.8 percent). The distribution is very skewed and 
very close to a log-normal distribution, with a mean value of $186 million and a 
median value of $20 million.  
 
4.2 Concordance  
Since we want to investigate to what extent (revealed) comparative advantage (as 
measured by the Balassa index) determines individual M&As, we have to make a 
connection between the sectors as identified by SIC code in the Thomson data base 
and trade data which allows us to calculate the Balassa index. For the latter, see sub-
section 4.3 below, we use the database from Feenstra et al. (2005) which provides 
trade data between countries by commodity, classified by SITC (revision 2). So we 
have to match M&A data, classified by one code, with trade data, classified by 
another code. As a first step, a concordance between SITC (revision 2) and the 
international industrial classification ISIC (revision 2) is applied.13 The next step is to 
apply a concordance between ISIC (revision 2) and the SIC87 industrial classification, 
which is the classification used in the Thomson M&A database. This concordance, 
from 3-digit ISIC (revision 2) industries to 2-digit SIC87 industries, is based on a 
matching of industry names. Since SIC87 was initially derived from ISIC (revision 2), 
this matching was fairly straightforward.14  
 
The above exercise results in 20 sectors for which we have reliable trade data (and 
thus information on revealed comparative advantage), see Figure 3. A complete list of 
countries and SIC-sectors in our sample can be found in Appendix I. Finally, we 
restricted our set of M&A observations to those sectors for which both acquirer and 
target are an element of the concordance subset ( 'I ), see sub-section 4.3 below. This 
reduced the number of observations to 3,462, with the summary information as given 
in Table 4. Note that, as a result of this restriction, the share of horizontal M&As 
increases (from 48.0 to 64.5 percent), as did the share of complete takeovers (from 
                                                 
12 The obvious drawback of the restriction to within-sector M&As is that it reduces the number of 
observations. 
13 For this concordance, see: 
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/Concordances/Fr
omSITC/sitc2.isic2.txt  
14 This concordance is available upon request.  
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76.8 to 86.3 percent complete ownership after the M&A), see also section 8. There is 
very little effect on the value distribution of M&As (which is still log-normal).  
 
Table 4 Overview of M&As; concordance subset ( 'I ), 1980-2005 
  Acquirer  
 AUS FRA USA GBR NLD Sum 
# of M&As       
Target AUS 106 3 85 64 3 261 
 FRA 3 54 160 185 14 416 
 USA 56 112 624 832 71 1,695 
 GBR 21 74 497 252 34 878 
 NLD 3 14 67 113 15 212 
 sum 189 257 1,433 1,446 137 3,462 
per cent       
 AUS 3.1 0.1 2.5 1.8 0.1 7.5 
 FRA 0.1 1.6 4.6 5.3 0.4 12.0 
 USA 1.6 3.2 18.0 24.0 2.1 49.0 
 GBR 0.6 2.1 14.4 7.3 1.0 25.4 
 NLD 0.1 0.4 1.9 3.3 0.4 6.1 
 sum 5.5 7.4 41.4 41.8 4.0 100 
Horizontal M&As (2-digit sic level): 2,234 (64.5%) 
100 % acquired in M&A 2,833 (81.8%) 
100 % owned after M&A 2,987 (86.3%) 
Value of transaction (million $): mean 175.93 
    median 22.50 
    maximum 27,223.95 
 
 
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of the number of M&As over the various sectors of 
the concordance subset 'I . In general, the correlation between targets and acquirers for 
a sector is high, which is not too surprising in view of the high share of horizontal 
M&As. The most active sectors are SIC 28 (Chemicals), SIC 36 (Electronics), SIC 35 
(Ind. machinery), SIC 38 (Instruments), and SIC 20 (Food). Foreshadowing our 
M&As: waves and comparative advantage 
© Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk, 2008 16
estimation results, we should point out here that, as Figure 3 suggests is the case for 
most sectors, a high correlation between the number of targets and acquirers is not in 
itself evidence that all/ most cross-border M&As are intra-industry. 
 
Figure 3 Sector distribution of M&As, concordance subset 'I , 1980-2005 
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The figure gives brief sector descriptions only; see Appendix I for details. 
 
4.3 Balassa index characteristics 
Let jtiX ,  denote the value of exports of sector Ii∈  from country Jj∈  in period 
Tt∈ . Then the Balassa index jtiBI ,  of revealed comparative advantage is defined as 
(5) ∑∑∑∑ ≡≡≡≡ i j jti,tj jti,tii jti,jt
tti,
j
t
j
ti,j
ti XXXXXXwhereXX
XX
BI ;;;
/
/
,,  
If 1, >jtiBI , indicating that sector i’s share in country j’s exports in period t is larger 
than in the group of reference countries J , country j is said to have a revealed 
comparative advantage in sector i.  
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Table 5  Summary information for Balassa index (BI), 1980 – 2000 
a. Benchmark  
Statistic All AUS FRA NLD GBR USA 
# Observations 2,100 420 420 420 420 420 
Mean 0.94 0.85 0.89 1.03 0.96 0.98 
Median 0.79 0.33 0.82 0.72 0.87 0.91 
Variance 0.59 1.37 0.14 0.87 0.30 0.25 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.14 
Maximum 6.44 6.44 2.06 5.62 3.09 2.87 
# BI >1 676 98 164 104 139 171 
Share BI > 1 (%) 32.2 23.3 39.0 24.8 33.1 40.7 
b. M&A  acquirer 
Statistic All AUS FRA NLD GBR USA 
# Observations 3,462 189 257 137 1,446 1,433 
Mean 1.08 1.24 1.06 1.10 1.04 1.10 
Median 1.00 0.77 1.13 0.89 0.98 1.01 
Variance 0.19 1.34 0.10 0.39 0.11 0.11 
Minimum 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.13 0.16 0.19 
Maximum 6.44 6.44 1.75 3.89 2.58 2.48 
# BI >1 1,783 61 150 48 673 851 
Share BI > 1 (%) 51.5 32.3 58.4 35.0 46.5 59.4 
c. M&A  target 
Statistic All AUS FRA NLD GBR USA 
# Observations 3,462 261 416 212 878 1,695 
Mean 1.08 1.12 1.00 1.14 1.04 1.11 
Median 1.00 0.71 0.96 0.90 0.99 1.03 
Variance 0.24 1.29 0.11 0.62 0.12 0.12 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.12 0.15 0.15 
Maximum 6.44 6.44 1.75 5.62 2.43 2.54 
# BI >1 1,800 76 200 79 421 1,024 
Share BI > 1 (%) 52.0 29.1 48.1 37.3 47.9 60.4 
For M&A acquirer and target in the period 2001-2005 the (most recent) BI of 2000 was used. 
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We have annual observations available for the period 1980-2000. Our group of 
reference countries J  consists of the OECD countries. The core of our paper analyzes 
a subset of data, consisting of 20 2-digit SIC sectors ( II ⊂' ) and 5 individual OECD 
countries ( JJ ⊂' ), see Appendix I.15 Table 5 provides summary statistics on the 
distribution of the Balassa index for the five countries separately and combined for 
three different data selections, namely (a) the benchmark distribution for all sectors in 
our data set for all years, (b) the distribution of the Balassa index for the acquirer of 
an M&A, and (c) similarly for the target of an M&A. Note that the number of 
observations is lower for the benchmark distribution in Table 5 (2,100 in panel (a) as 
compared to 3,462 in panels (b) and (c)). The reason for this is that the benchmark 
distribution for the Balassa index for our 5 countries counts each sector only once 
whereas for the acquirer (target) Balassa index distribution (panels b and c) the 
number of acquiring (target) firms is the unit of observation. This explains why in 
panel a the number of observations is the same for all 5 countries (420), but not in 
panels b and c with the USA and UK having far more than 420 observations because 
of the large number of US and UK acquiring and target firms.   
 
A few observations on these statistics can readily be made.  
 The distribution differs per country. The benchmark median for the USA (0.91), 
for example, is almost three times that for Australia (0.33). Similarly, the benchmark 
share of sectors with a Balassa index above 1 is higher for the USA (40.7 percent) 
than for Australia (23.3 percent) and the Netherlands (24.8 percent).  
 The Balassa index is higher for the acquirer than the benchmark. For each 
individual country and for the group as a whole, the mean, median, and the share of 
sectors with a Balassa index above 1 is higher for the M&A acquirer distribution than 
for the benchmark distribution.  
 The Balassa index is higher for the target than the benchmark. Again, for all 
countries the mean, median, and the share of sectors with a Balassa index above 1 is 
higher for the M&A target distribution than for the benchmark distribution.  
 
                                                 
15 When calculating the Balassa index for the respective sub-groups, we do include all exports of goods 
and services for an individual country (sectors I) and relate this to the exports of all reference countries 
(OECD countries J), see equation (5).  
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Figure 4 Relationship between M&As and revealed comparative advantage 
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These findings are illustrated for the share of sectors with a Balassa index above 1 in 
Figure 4. Note that the Balassa index appears to be higher for both acquirer and target. 
To some extent this represents a problem for the GOLE model as the acquirer is 
thought to be a more efficient firm than the target. To some extent this is in line with 
the theoretical model, as the difference between the acquirer’s and the target’s 
efficiency should not be too large.16 We will present estimation results for both 
acquirers and targets. Figure 4 visualizes the model’s main prediction in terms of 
hypothesis 1. For acquiring firms we must test, as Figure 4 suggests, whether it is 
indeed true that the cross-sector distribution of the Balassa index when sectors are 
weighted by the number of acquiring firms lies significantly above the corresponding 
distribution when sector are unweighted (as with the benchmark in Figure 4).   
 
The disadvantage of focusing on a few summary statistics, as given in Table 5 and 
Figure 4, is that it ignores the majority of the information available in the underlying 
distribution functions. Although these distributions of the Balassa index for the 
individual countries and the group as a whole are not known, we can apply the 
distribution-free Harmonic Mass index procedure developed by Hinloopen and van 
Marrewijk (2005) to test formally if any pair of distribution functions is identical.17 
With a 5 per cent significance level, this leads to the following formal conclusions 
(see Appendix II): 
                                                 
16 Again, a similar prediction holds for Bertrand and Zitouna (2006).  
17 This is a non-parametric method to compare two distributions of data, in order to see whether the 
distributions differ, see for a motivation of this method: 
http://people.few.eur.nl/vanmarrewijk/pdf/marrewijk/ti%20dp%202005%20122.pdf  
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 The benchmark distribution differs significantly from the M&A acquirer and 
target distributions, both in the aggregate and for individual countries. 
 The M&A acquirer distribution does not differ significantly from the M&A target 
distributions, both in the aggregate and for individual countries, with the exception 
of France. 
 The distributions for individual countries differs significantly, with the exception 
of France – USA in the benchmark. 
 
Figure 5 Comparison of comparative advantage distributions, 1980-2005 
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These conclusions are illustrated for the aggregate distributions in Figure 5 using P-P 
(probability – probability) plots, a method for comparing distribution functions used 
as the basis for the Harmonic mass index which, if the underlying distributions are 
identical, results in a plot coinciding with the diagonal. Clearly, the deviation between 
the plot and the diagonal is large if we compare the benchmark with the acquirer’s 
distribution and small if we compare the acquirer’s and the target’s distribution.  
 
4.4 Waves 
We finally turn to the introduction of merger waves in order to be in a position to test 
hypotheses 2A-D in the next sections. To get a first indication of M&A waves, we let 
)(tN ki  denote the number of M&As in sector 'Ii∈  in the k  year period immediately 
preceding period time t  (for all countries 'Jj∈  combined). We denote their sum by 
)(tN k , that is ∑∈≡ ' )()( Ii kik tNtN . Figure 6a depicts the evolution over time of )(1 tN  
and )(2 tN , that is the number of M&As in the previous one and two years, 
respectively. There have been two clear waves for all sectors combined, namely 
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around 1990-1991 and around 1999-2001 (this is most evident over a two-year 
period). Figures 6b and 6c, similarly, depict the evolution over time within a one-year 
and two-year period for some individual sectors from the acquirer’s perspective.18 
Although the sector peaks coincide largely with the aggregate peaks around 1990 and 
2000, there are also sector-specific peaks, for example at the end of 2004 for SIC 28 
(Chemicals and allied products) and around 1995-1996 for sic 20 (Food and kindred 
products). 
 
Figure 6 M&A waves 
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b. M&A waves; # of M&As, acquirer sic in past year
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18 At the sector level we can distinguish between the number of M&As in the acquirer’s sector and in 
the target’s sector in the k-year period preceding time t. The difference is generally small and 
disappears in the aggregate (when we sum over all sectors). 
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5  Deciding on the estimation model 
To test the hypotheses 1A-B and 2A-D outlined at the end of section 3, we analyze the 
number of M&As undertaken by firms in a specific country and sector for the period 
1980-2004, both from an acquirer’s and a target’s perspective. As there are 5 
countries, 20 sectors, and 25 years, this leads to a total of 2,500 acquiring and 2,500 
target observations. Taking country- and sector-specific effects into account, our 
focus is thus on the impact of revealed comparative advantage, as measured by the 
Balassa index, and M&A waves. Our dependent variable is a discrete counting 
variable ( iy , is the number of M&As in a specific country and sector in a given year).  
In the tables with estimation results in the remainder of the paper the following holds. 
From an acquiring perspective, the dependent variable is the number of M&As 
acquired by a specific country and sector in a given year. The wave variables then 
refer to the number of acquisitions in the year before or the two years before (for all 
countries and sectors and for the country and sector in question). From a target 
perspective, the dependent variable is the number of M&A targets in a specific 
country and sector in a given year. The wave variables then refer to the number of 
targets in the year before or the two years before (again for all countries and sectors 
and for the specific country and sector in question). With respect to revealed 
comparative advantage, two Balassa index results are reported. The variable BI simply 
reports the value of the Balassa index for the specific country and sector in that year. 
Since this index differs significantly between countries (section 4), we constructed 
Balassa index–country interactions, to deal with these differences. The BIAU variable, 
for example, reports the value of the Balassa index for Australia for the sector under 
consideration if the country is Australia, and zero otherwise.19 
 
An obvious first candidate model for the estimations is the Poisson regression model 
(see e.g. Greene, 2003) and to use this model for both acquirer and target firms. For 
the Poisson model the conditional density of iy  given ix  is: 
(8) !/),(),( ),( i
y
i
xm
ii yxmexyf ii ββ β−=  
where )'exp(),(),( βββ iiii xxyExm ==  is the conditional mean.  
                                                 
19 Note that we do not include the BIUS variable to avoid (almost) overidentification. 
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In Appendix III we present the estimation results based upon the Poisson estimates. 
The most important restriction of the Poisson model is the equality of the conditional 
mean and variance, see below. The Poisson estimates in Appendix III provide support 
for the hypothesis that acquiring firms are operative in sectors with a strong 
comparative advantage, but not for the hypothesis that target firms are operative in 
sectors with a weak comparative advantage. On the contrary, target firms also seem to 
operate in relatively strong sectors, although the effect is not as clear-cut as for 
acquiring firms (and not significant for France and the UK). Of the various merger 
wave variables, the global number of M&As for all sectors in the previous year is 
significant and positive in all Poisson estimations. Rather than discussing these 
Poisson results in more detail, we want to point out that the Poisson equation is mis-
specified as there is overdispersion in the data, because the conditional mean and 
variance are not equal (which is a condition to use the Poisson equation). Table 6 
reports the results of two tests of this restriction, based on the work of Cameron and 
Trivedi (1990) and Wooldridge (1990). 
 
Table 6 Poisson restriction tests; shape estimates 2η , (standard errors in parentheses)
  acquiring perspective target perspective 
  
Table A.3 
column 2 
Table A.3 
column 3 
Table A.3 
column 4 
Table A.3 
column 5 
Cameron-Trivedi test 0.0826*** 0.0827*** 0.0640*** 0.0710*** 
  (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
Wooldridge test 0.1101*** 0.1117*** 0.1128** 0.1171** 
  (0.0249) (0.0251) (0.0520) (0.0526) 
*** = statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, and * 10% level 
 
An extension of the Poisson model is provided by the more flexibile negative 
binomial model, see for example Bloningen (1997), Coughlin and Segev (2000), and 
Barry, et al. (2003), for which the following moment conditions hold: 
(9) )),(1)(,(),var();,(),( 2 βηββββ iiiiiii xmxmxyxmxyE +==  
Note that 2η  (referred to as the “shape” parameter) is a measure of the extent to 
which the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean. In effect, the Cameron – 
Trivedi and Wooldridge tests reported in Table 6 are estimates of the parameter 2η . 
All estimates of 2η  in Table 6 are highly significant, such that there is indeed 
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overdispersion in the data. We therefore use a two-step negative binomial Quasi 
Maximum Likelihood estimation, termed the quasi-generalized pseudo-maximum 
likelihood estimator by Gourieroux, et al. (1984a,b), by using the estimates of the 
Wooldridge tests ( 11.0ˆ2 =η ) in the negative binomial estimates. We used the robust 
Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML) estimation procedure in the sequel as it produces 
more consistent estimates of the parameters of a correctly specified conditional mean 
than the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation procedure, even if the distribution is 
incorrectly specified, combined with the Huber/White robust covariance estimation 
procedure. All reported estimations have include country- and sector fixed effects. 
 
6 Firm level estimation results 
6.1 Negative binomial estimates for the acquirer 
In this sub-section we present our estimation results for the acquiring firm, see Tables 
7A and 7B, which give the estimation results for the Balassa index and the Balassa-
country interactions respectively. In both cases we first give the estimation results for 
the Balassa index and waves variables separately. In the “both” column the Balassa 
and wave variables are combined. The “selection” column gives the results after a 
sequential elimination procedure of the most insignificant variables (lowest 
probabilities) in the “both” specification. This leads to the inclusion of only those 
variables that were at least significant at the 10 percent level.20 Our discussion focuses 
on these estimates (last column of Table 7A). With respect to hypothesis 1A, we find 
clear and strong supporting evidence that acquiring firms are active in sectors in 
which the country has a strong comparative advantage. As for the various merger 
waves, we find no support for a global sector effect (hypothesis 2A) and a positive 
global total effect (hypothesis 2B).21 At the country level, we find a positive country-
sector effect (hypothesis 2C) and a mixed country-total effect (hypothesis 2D; namely 
a positive 1-year effect and a negative 2-year effect). As will become clear below, 
these results are very robust with respect to the impact of comparative advantage and 
the positive wave effects (global-total and country-sector), whereas the country-total 
wave effect is usually negative (rather than mixed). 
                                                 
20 Details of the intermediate results are available from the authors upon request. 
21 The wave variables introduce a problem of multi-collinearity. A possible solution to this is to 
construct a ‘principal component’ of waves. We choose not to do so, to illustrate the effects of different 
types of waves as clearly as possible. 
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Table 7A Negative Binomial Count; QML (parameter = 0.11), acquiring perspective 
(standard errors in parentheses), [incidence rate ratio in square brackets] 
  Balassa Waves Both Select 
Balassa index     
 BI 0.3578***  0.2549*** 0.2573*** [22] 
  (0.0558)  (0.0521) (0.0518) 
Waves     
 all-sec1  0.0042 0.0036  
   (0.0100) (0.0098)  
 all-sec1+2  -0.0050 -0.0030  
   (0.0059) (0.0059)  
 all-tot1  0.0070*** 0.0070*** 0.0065*** [71] 
   (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0006) 
 all-tot1+2  -0.0001 -0.0002  
   (0.0010) (0.0010)  
 co-sec1  -0.0024 -0.0010  
   (0.0168) (0.0166)  
 co-sec1+2  0.0257*** 0.0194** 0.0176*** [10] 
   (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0048) 
 co-tot1  0.0074* 0.0073* 0.0087*** [34] 
   (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0026) 
 co-tot1+2  -0.0056** -0.0052** -0.0059*** [-33] 
   (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0013) 
co-sec fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -3,010 -2,498 -2,485 -2,485 
Restr log likelihood -32,418 -29,993 -29,993 -29,993 
LR statistic 58,816*** 54,990*** 55,017*** 55,016*** 
LR index (pseudo-R2) 0.907 0.917 0.917 0.917 
# observations 2,500 2,300 2,300 2,300 
tot = total, co = country, sec = sector, sub-index 1 = one year ago, sub-index 1+2 = 1 and 2 years ago. 
*** = statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, and * 10% level. Huber/White st errors. 
 
To gauge the economic importance of the various estimates in Table 7A, beyond the 
observation that the estimated coefficient differs significantly from zero, the last 
column of the table reports the incidence rate ratio (irr). For variable k with standard 
deviation ksd  and estimated coefficient kβ  this ratio is defined in equation (6). It 
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indicates by what percentage the expected number of M&A-acquisitions increases if 
the variable in question rises by one standard deviation.  
(6)  ( )1100 −×= × kk sdk eirr β  
The table shows that a one-standard deviation increase in the Balassa index raises the 
expected number of M&A-acquisitions by 22 percent. A similar increase in the 
global-total merger wave variable (1-year) is more important as it raises the expected 
number of M&A-acquisitions by 71 percent. The country-sector effect is weaker with 
an expected increase of 10 percent.22  
 
Table 7B provides similar estimates as Table 7A, but now based on the Balassa index 
– country interaction specification (which takes into consideration that the BI index 
differs significantly between countries, see section 4). Again, we find strong support 
for hypothesis 1A as the BI-country effects are significantly positive for all countries. 
A one-standard deviation increase in the Balassa index leads to an expected increase 
in the number of M&A-acquisitions of 23, 22, 15, and 11 percent in Australia, France, 
the Netherlands, and the UK, respectively (see the last column of the table). The 
results for hypothesis 2 on the merger wave effects in terms of estimated coefficients, 
significance, and economic impact are comparable to those of the simpler 
specification in Table 7A. In both specifications (Tables 7A and 7B), the estimated 
significance is robust with respect to the specification when the comparative 
advantage (Balassa) effect and the wave effects are taken separately or both are 
included together. The estimated coefficients do change, however, when both effects 
are taken into consideration simultaneously. This holds particularly for the Balassa 
index variables and less so for the wave variables. All estimated specifications in 
tables 7A and 7B are highly significant and explain a large share of the variance in the 
number of M&A-acquisitions (highly significant LR statistic and an LR index 
[pseudo-R2] of 0.907 or higher). 
                                                 
22 The 1-year and (1+2)-year reported incidence rate ratio’s for the country-total merger waves (+34 
and -33 percent) are ceteris paribus. By construction these two variables are related and the total effect 
when this is taken into consideration is small.  
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Table 7B Negative Binomial Count; QML (parameter = 0.11), acquiring perspective 
(standard errors in parentheses), [incidence rate ratio in square brackets] 
  Balassa Waves Both Select 
Balassa index     
 BIAU 0.3914***  0.3231*** 0.3264*** [23] 
  (0.0696)  (0.0674) (0.0671) 
 BIFR 0.5006**  0.5106** 0.5154** [22] 
  (0.2340)  (0.2186) (0.2185) 
 BINT 0.2863**  0.2378** 0.2383** [15] 
  (0.1312)  (0.1209) (0.1219) 
 BIUK 0.4948***  0.2366** 0.2388** [11] 
  (0.1319)  (0.1162) (0.1163) 
Waves     
 all-sec1  0.0042 0.0037  
   (0.0100) (0.0099)  
 all-sec1+2  -0.0050 -0.0033  
   (0.0059) (0.0059)  
 all-tot1  0.0070*** 0.0069*** 0.0064*** [71] 
   (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0006) 
 all-tot1+2  -0.0001 -0.0002  
   (0.0010) (0.0010)  
 co-sec1  -0.0024 -0.0017  
   (0.0168) (0.0167)  
 co-sec1+2  0.0257*** 0.0210** 0.0187*** [11] 
   (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0048) 
 co-tot1  0.0074* 0.0074* 0.0086*** [34] 
   (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0026) 
 co-tot1+2  -0.0056** -0.0053** -0.0059*** [-33] 
   (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0013) 
co-sec fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -3,009 -2,498 -2,482 -2,483 
Restr log likelihood -32,418 -29,993 -29,993 -29,993 
LR statistic 58,818*** 54,990*** 55,022*** 55,022*** 
LR index (pseudo-R2) 0.907 0.917 0.917 0.917 
# observations 2,500 2,300 2,300 2,300 
tot = total, co = country, sec = sector, sub-index 1 = one year ago, sub-index 1+2 = 1 and 2 years ago. 
*** = statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, and * 10% level. Huber/White st errors. 
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6.2 Negative binomial estimates for the target 
Using a similar approach as in sub-section 6.1 from an acquiring perspective, we now 
discuss our main results from a target perspective. Table 8A provides estimation 
results on the simple Balassa index approach while Table 8B gives the results for the 
Balassa – country interactions. 
 
Table 8A Negative Binomial Count; QML (parameter = 0.11), target perspective 
(standard errors in parentheses), [incidence rate ratio in square brackets] 
  Balassa Waves Both Select 
Balassa index     
 BI 0.2836***  0.1647** 0.1708*** [14] 
  (0.0545)  (0.0523) (0.0514) 
Waves     
 all-sec1  -0.0082 -0.0081 -0.0103** [-9] 
   (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0050) 
 all-sec1+2  -0.0021 -0.0011  
   (0.0053) (0.0053)  
 all-tot1  0.0098*** 0.0098*** 0.0086*** [105] 
   (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0006) 
 all-tot1+2  -0.0006 -0.0007  
   (0.0010) (0.0010)  
 co-sec1  0.0278 0.0278 0.0466*** [14] 
   (0.0184) (0.0180) (0.0091) 
 co-sec1+2  0.0165 0.0125  
   (0.0113) (0.0113)  
 co-tot1  -0.0008 -0.0008  
   (0.0036) (0.0036)  
 co-tot1+2  -0.0041** -0.0038* -0.0042*** [-23] 
   (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0009) 
co-sec fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -3,234 -2,687 -2,680 -2,682 
Restr log likelihood -32,241 -29,815 -29,815 -29,815 
LR statistic 58,014*** 54,256*** 54,269*** 54,266*** 
LR index (pseudo-R2) 0.900 0.910 0.910 0.910 
# observations 2,500 2,300 2,300 2,300 
tot = total, co = country, sec = sector, sub-index 1 = one year ago, sub-index 1+2 = 1 and 2 years ago. 
*** = statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, and * 10% level. Huber/White st errors. 
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Focusing attention first on hypothesis 1B (target firms operate in sectors with a low 
revealed comparative advantage) we can conclude that this hypothesis is soundly 
rejected. Not only do we not find evidence that target firms are active in weak sectors, 
but to the contrary we find evidence that target firms are also active in strong sectors. 
This effect from a target perspective is weaker than from an acquirer perspective since 
(i) the positive Balassa – country interaction effect for the target does not hold for 
France and the UK (Table 8B) and (ii) the simple Balassa effect is weaker for the 
target than for the acquirer (compare Tables 7A and 8A). Regarding the latter, a one-
standard deviation increase in the Balassa index leads to a 22 percent increase in the 
expected number of M&A-acquisitions and a 14 percent increase in the expected 
number of M&A targets. The rejection of hypothesis 1B contradicts with a strict 
interpretation of the two-country GOLE model. We thus label this result the ‘target 
paradox’. The next section argues that our empirical results can be explained in a 
heterogenous firms, multi-country extension of the GOLE model.  
 
Turning now to the merger waves hypotheses, we find that both the simple Balassa 
approach and the Balassa – country interaction approach lead to similar results, 
namely a negative global-sector effect (hypothesis 2A), a positive global-total effect 
(hypothesis 2B), a positive country-sector effect (hypothesis 2C), and a negative 
country-total effect (hypothesis 2D). More generally (see the estimates to come and 
the overview in section 9), this illustrates that if we find a significant effect at the 
global level (for the sector in question or all sectors together) we find the opposite 
effect at the country level (or not significant, or mixed over the two lags). In terms of 
economic impact, the global-total wave effect is the most important, where a one-
standard deviation increase raises the expected number of M&A targets by 105 
percent in Table 8A and by 110 percent in Table 8B. All estimated specifications in 
tables 8A and 8B are highly significant and explain a large share of the variance in the 
number of M&A-targets (highly significant LR statistic and an LR index [pseudo-R2] 
of 0.900 or higher). 
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Table 8B Negative Binomial Count; QML (parameter = 0.11), target perspective 
(standard errors in parentheses), [incidence rate ratio in square brackets] 
  Balassa Waves Both Select 
Balassa index     
 BIAU 0.3218***  0.2238*** 0.2211*** [15] 
  (0.0716)  (0.0649) (0.0649) 
 BIFR 0.0287  -0.0185  
  (0.2097)  (0.1885)  
 BINT 0.4014***  0.3136** 0.3162** [21] 
  (0.1329)  (0.1249) (0.1258) 
 BIUK 0.3340**  0.1427  
  (0.1397)  (0.1267)  
Waves     
 all-sec1  -0.0082 -0.0081  
   (0.0091) (0.0090)  
 all-sec1+2  -0.0021 -0.0016 -0.0066** [-11] 
   (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0027) 
 all-tot1  0.0098*** 0.0098*** 0.0089*** [110] 
   (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0006) 
 all-tot1+2  -0.0006 -0.0006  
   (0.0010) (0.0010)  
 co-sec1  0.0278 0.0278  
   (0.0184) (0.0180)  
 co-sec1+2  0.0165 0.0141 0.0290*** [17] 
   (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0056) 
 co-tot1  -0.0008 -0.0009  
   (0.0036) (0.0035)  
 co-tot1+2  -0.0041** -0.0039* -0.0047*** [-25] 
   (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0009) 
co-sec fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -3,232 -2,687 -2,676 -2,678 
Restr log likelihood -32,241 -29,815 -29,815 -29,815 
LR statistic 58,017*** 54,256*** 54,278*** 54,273*** 
LR index (pseudo-R2) 0.900 0.910 0.910 0.910 
# observations 2,500 2,300 2,300 2,300 
tot = total, co = country, sec = sector, sub-index 1 = one year ago, sub-index 1+2 = 1 and 2 years ago. 
*** = statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, and * 10% level. Huber/White st errors. 
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7 Explaining the target paradox 
In section 6 we have established that (i) both acquiring and target firms tend to be 
operative in a country’s strong sectors and (ii) this effect is more pronounced for 
acquiring firms than for target firms. We can explain this apparent ‘target paradox’ if 
we extend the GOLE model to a multi-country setting and simultaneously allow for 
firm heterogeneity within countries. For simplicity, we just consider three countries, 
A, B, and C, and discuss the implications of a more general setting. Based on Melitz 
(2003), firm heterogeneity is modeled as new entrants drawing a productivity 
parameter from a country-sector-specific distribution function. For the sector under 
consideration, we will assume that country A is strong, country C is weak, and 
country B is in between. Modeling this as a mean-shifting process, the average ex ante 
production costs will be lowest for country A, intermediate for country B, and highest 
for country C, see Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7 Production trade and M&As in a multi-country setting 
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In the Neary (2007) model two cut-offs are important. First, if production costs are 
too high, the firm is not viable and will exit the market. Second, if production costs 
are too low, a firm is too profitable, and thus too costly, to take over. Assuming, for 
simplicity, that these cut-offs are the same for the three countries, we label these the 
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Production cut-off and the M&A cut-off in Figure 7, respectively. Neary shows that 
the M&A cut-off is below the Production cut-off, as shown. We discuss the 
implications in terms of production, trade, and M&As for each country in turn.  
 
Strong country A. Most firms in the strong country A have costs below the Production 
cut-off (point G) and therefore do not exit the market. The firms with costs below the 
M&A cut-off (the share of country A firms to the left of DF) are too profitable to take 
over. Instead, these firms are potential acquirers of other firms. The country-A firms 
in between the M&A cut-off and the Production cut-off (points DFG) are potential 
targets for other firms. All firms that do not exit the market produce and export goods, 
as reflected by a high Balassa index. In short, strong country A has a large share of 
potential acquiring firms and potential target firms, as well as a high Balassa index.  
 
Weak country C. Almost all firms in the weak country C have costs above the 
Production cut-off (to the right of GH) and therefore exit the market. The few 
remaining firms are (in our example) potential targets for takeover. In view of their 
high costs, the production and export level is low and so is the Balassa index. Note 
that if country C is weaker still (the distribution shifts sufficiently further to the right) 
there would be no potential target firms to take over and the Balassa index would be 
zero. Empirical information on the Balassa index shows that countries export only in a 
sub-set of sectors and have a revealed comparative advantage (BI > 1) in only about 
one-third of the sectors with positive export flows, see Hinloopen and van Marrewijk 
(2001, 2008). One should therefore imagine many countries to look like the weak 
country C with no or only a few potential target firms and a low Balassa index.  
 
Intermediate country B. A substantial number of the firms in the intermediate country 
B has costs above the Production cut-off (to the right of GI) and will therefore exit the 
market. The remaining firms can be subdivided into two groups. The more productive 
firms have costs below the M&A cut-off (to the left of DE) and are therefore potential 
acquirers of other firms. The group of firms in between the two cut-offs (points 
DEIG) will produce and export goods and are potential M&A targets. Although the 
extent of comparative advantage is less strong than for country A, country B firms 
still play a major role in the global export market for this good and has a higher 
Balassa index than weak countries, like country C. In short, intermediate country B 
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has a large share of potential target firms but also a substantial share of potential 
acquiring firms, as well as a fairly high Balassa index. 
 
Based on the above observations, what we should expect, therefore, from a multi-
country heterogeneous firm extension of the GOLE model, is that (i) both acquiring 
and target firms are active in strong sectors (high Balassa index), (ii) this effect is 
more pronounced for acquiring than for target firms, and (iii) these observations are 
caused by the fact that countries with weak sectors (low Balassa index) have no or 
only a few potential target firms to take over. Our estimation results above are in 
accordance with these findings.  
 
8 Robustness 
8.1 Estimation results for horizontal M&As 
In our discussion of Figure 3 in sub-section 4.3 we noted that the GOLE model is in 
fact only concerned with intra-industry M&As. The model simply makes no 
predictions about inter-industry M&As. Assuming that each of our 20 SIC2 sectors 
represents a single industry, we re-estimated all equations for horizontal M&As only, 
that is for those M&As where the acquiring and target firm belong to the same SIC2 
sector. The share of horizontal M&As in our overall data set (after taking care of the 
concordance issue) is 64.5 percent. Based on the results for the Wooldridge estimate 
we use shape parameter of 13.0ˆ 2 =η  in the subsequent negative binomial count 
estimations.23 For the sake of brevity, we only present the estimation results for the 
“select” specifications, see Table 9. The results are comparable with those reported in 
sections 6.1 and 6.2 for the full sample. From the acquiring perspective the only 
exception is that the Balassa-country interaction variable for France is no longer 
significant. This also means that in terms of hypotheses 1A and 1B, we again find 
confirmation that acquiring firms come from sectors that have a revealed comparative 
advantage, and that this holds in a weaker sense for target firms. The results for 
merger waves are also largely comparable to those shown before, see the overview 
and discussion in section 9.  
 
                                                 
23 Details available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 9 Negative Binomial Count for horizontal M&As;  
QML (parameter = 0.13), (standard errors in parentheses), select 
  acquiring perspective target perspective 
Balassa index     
 BI 0.2677***  0.2202***  
  (0.0607)  (0.0587)  
 BIAU  0.3658***  0.2844*** 
   (0.0793)  (0.0745) 
 BINT  0.2837**  0.4863*** 
   (0.1240)  (0.1242) 
 BIUK  0.2379+   
   (0.1492)   
Waves     
 all-sec1+2 -0.0090** -0.0090**   
  (0.0044) (0.0044)   
 all-tot1 0.0130*** 0.0129*** 0.0146*** 0.0146*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0019) 
 all-tot1+2   -0.0020* -0.0020* 
    (0.0011) (0.0011) 
 co-sec1+2 0.0284*** 0.0284*** 0.0302*** 0.0298*** 
  (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0072) (0.0072) 
 co-tot1     
      
 co-tot1+2 -0.0055*** -0.0054*** -0.0048*** -0.0048*** 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
co-sec fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -1,981 -1,979 -2,084 -2,077 
Restr log likelihood -22,105 -22,105 -22,023 -22,023 
LR statistic 40,248*** 40,253*** 39,879*** 39,891*** 
LR index (pseudo-R2) 0.910 0.910 0.905 0.906 
# observations 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300 
tot = total, co = country, sec = sector, sub-index 1 = one year ago, sub-index 1+2 = 1 and 2 years ago. 
*** = statistically significant at 1%, ** 5% level, * 10%, and + 15% level; Huber/White st errors. 
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Table 10 Pure cross-border negative binomial count; QML (parameter = 0.10) 
(standard errors in parentheses), select  
  acquirer target 
Balassa index     
 BI 0.3150***  0.1788***  
  (0.0668)  (0.0600)  
 BIAU  0.2712**  0.1665* 
   (0.1110)  (0.0865) 
 BIFR  0.5534**   
   (0.2498)   
 BINT  0.2086+  0.3529*** 
   (0.1416)  (0.1247) 
 BIUK  0.3666**  0.2483* 
   (0.1446)  (0.1500) 
Waves     
 all-sec1   -0.0121* -0.0135** 
    (0.0067) (0.0067) 
 all-tot1   0.0105*** 0.0106*** 
    (0.0009) (0.0009) 
 all-tot1+2 0.0035*** 0.0035***   
  (0.0004) (0.0004)   
 co-sec1   0.0613*** 0.0656*** 
    (0.0134) (0.0132) 
 co-sec1+2 0.0233*** 0.0253***   
  (0.0072) (0.0073)   
 co-tot1 0.0313*** 0.0312***   
  (0.0036) (0.0036)   
 co-tot1+2 -0.0152*** -0.0153*** -0.0045*** -0.0047*** 
  (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
co-sec fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -2,107 -2,109 -2,324 -2,322 
Restr log likelihood -33,626 -33,626 -33,386 -33,386 
LR statistic 63,040*** 63,035*** 62,124*** 62,129*** 
LR index (pseudo-R2) 0.937 0.937 0.930 0.930 
# observations 2300 2300 2300 2300 
tot = total, co = country, sec = sector, sub-index 1 = one year ago, sub-index 1+2 = 1 and 2 years ago. 
*** = statistically significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, and + 15% level; Huber/White st errors. 
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8.2 Estimation results for pure cross-border M&As 
As noted in section 4, the Thomson data set sometimes classifies M&As as cross-
border even though the headquarters of both acquirer and target are located in the 
same country. We stress again that Thomson does this only in a small percentage of 
such within-country cases (namely if there is an important reason to do so, for 
example if the part that is taken over is largely active in another country). Our main 
results presented in section 6 include such within-country cross-border M&As. 
Obviously, such within-country M&As, where we register acquirer and target within 
the same country, tend to increase the number of horizontal M&As (see sub-section 
8.1) and the link between acquirer and target in terms of revealed comparative 
advantage. As a second robustness check, we therefore focused on pure cross-border 
M&As by excluding the within-country M&As. The share of horizontal M&As in our 
overall data set (after taking care of the concordance issue) is 69.7 percent. 
 
As in section 8.1, we re-estimated all equations, but now for pure cross-border M&As. 
The estimated shape parameter 10.0ˆ2 =η  in the subsequent negative binomial count 
estimations. Table 10 presents the “select” estimation results only. The results are 
very similar to those reported in sections 6.1 and 6.2 for the full sample. We again 
find confirmation that acquiring firms come from sectors that have a revealed 
comparative advantage, and that this holds in a weaker sense for target firms. The 
results for merger waves are also comparable, see the discussion in section 9.  
 
8.3 Further robustness checks 
As a way of providing further robustness checks, Appendix IV (see Tables A4 and A5 
for the acquiring and target perspective, respectively) provides estimation results for 
the negative binominal count estimation (in each column for the resulting “select” 
specification) when we estimate the model for two sub-periods. The first sub-period, 
1982-2000, is the period that coincides with the years for we which we have trade 
data to calculate the Balassa index. We used the most recent observation (year 2000) 
for the M&As in the years 2001-2004 in the tables above in the main text. Ignoring 
the last three years of observations does not materially affect our results (see Tables 
A4 and A5). Sub-sample estimations for the second sub-period, 1985-2004, correct 
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for the fact that US firms were over-represented in the Thomson data initially. Again, 
Tables A4 and A5 show that it does not affect our results for acquirers and targets, 
respectively, despite the more limited number of observations. The bottom line of 
these additional estimates is that our main findings are robust. 
 
9 Conclusions 
Traditionally, the modeling of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) provides only a 
partial understanding of cross-border M&As, which are thought to be related to 
economy-wide differences between countries. Peter Neary (2003, 2007) combines 
general equilibrium trade theory with imperfect markets and strategic behavior of 
firms to allow for the possibility of cross-border M&As (the GOLE model). We test 
two implications of this model, namely regarding strong and weak sectors and 
regarding merger waves. Our test procedure combines two large data sets, namely the 
bilateral sectoral international trade data compiled by Feenstra et al. (2005) and the 
Thomson data on individual M&As. 
 
The bilateral GOLE model does not incorporate within-country firm heterogeneity 
and focuses on global merger waves. The model predicts that firms in a country where 
a sector is strong take over firms in the country where this sector is weak. We 
operationalize a country’s strong and weak sectors based on the frequently used 
method of revealed comparative advantage (Balassa index). Hypothesis 1A argues 
that acquiring firms are active in sectors with a high Balassa index, while hypothesis 
1B argues that target firms are active in sectors with a low Balassa index. We test 
these hypotheses both using a simple Balassa index test and using a test that 
incorporates the fact that the Balassa distribution is country-specific (Balassa-country 
interaction). Our data allows us to identify both global and country-specific merger 
waves, for all sectors taken together (all) and for the sector under consideration. 
Hypotheses 2A-2D identify these four possible merger waves. We analyze the data 
both from an acquirer perspective and from a target perspective. Our main robustness 
checks focus on horizontal M&As only and on pure cross-border M&As.24 Table 11 
summarizes our main findings from these various perspectives, see Tables 7-10 for 
further details.  
 
                                                 
24 Secundary checks look at different time periods.  
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Table 11 Overview of support for hypotheses and estimation results 
a. Simple Balassa index test 
 acquiring perspective target perspective 
Hypothesis  all horiz. pure all horiz. pure 
1 Balassa index BI       
   A acquirer high BI yes yes yes - - - 
   B target low BI - - - no no no 
2 Waves+       
   A global sector no minus no minus no minus 
   B global all plus plus plus plus mixed plus 
   C country sector plus plus plus plus plus plus 
   D country all mixed minus minus minus minus minus 
b. Balassa index – country interactions test 
 acquiring perspective target perspective 
Hypothesis  all horiz. pure all horiz. pure 
1 Balassa index BI       
   A acquirer high BI yes yes* yes - - - 
   B target low BI - - - no no no 
2 Waves       
   A global sector no minus no minus no minus 
   B global all plus plus plus plus mixed plus 
   C country sector plus plus plus plus plus plus 
   D country all mixed minus minus minus minus minus 
all = all M&As included; horiz. = horizontal M&As only; pure = pure cross-border M&As only. 
+ no = no significant wave effect; plus = significant positive wave effect; minus = significant 
negative wave effect; mixed = significant positive 1-year effect and negative 2-year effect.  
* not for France 
 
We find strong and consistent support for hypothesis 1A (acquiring firms operate in 
strong sectors), but not for hypothesis 1B (target firms operate in weak sectors). In 
fact, we find support for the opposite effect: target firms also operate in strong sectors, 
although the effect is less pronounced than for acquiring firms. We label this finding 
the ‘target paradox’. As other studies before us, we find that merger waves are very 
important. The detailed structure of our data allows us to be more specific. In terms of 
economic importance, the dominant wave variable by far is the positive global-all 
effect, indicating that M&A waves are an economy-wide, global phenomenon. Of 
secundary economic importance at the country level, there is a positive country-sector 
effect and a negative country-all effect.  
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To explain the above-mentioned target paradox, we extend the GOLE model to a 
multi-country setting and simultaneously allow for firm heterogeneity within 
countries. We then show that we should expect that (i) both acquiring and target firms 
are active in strong sectors (high Balassa index), (ii) this effect is more pronounced 
for acquiring than for target firms, and (iii) these observations are caused by the fact 
that countries with weak sectors (low Balassa index) have no or only a few potential 
target firms to take over. Our estimation results are in accordance with these findings.  
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Appendix I Country and sector description 
Table A.1 Overview of analyzed sectors ( II ⊂' ) and countries ( JJ ⊂' ) 
a. Sectors 'I  b. Countries 'J    
SIC Description Code Name  
20 Food and kindred products AUS Australia 
21 Tobacco products FRA France 
22 Textile mill products NLD Netherlands 
23 Apparel and other textile products GBR United Kingdom 
24 Lumber and wood products USA United States 
25 Furniture and fixtures   
26 Paper and allied products   
27 Printing and publishing   
28 Chemicals and allied products   
29 Petroleum and coal products   
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products   
31 Leather and leather products   
32 Stone, clay, and glass products   
33 Primary metal industries   
34 Fabricated metal products   
35 Industrial machinery and equipment   
36 Electronic and other electric equipment   
37 Transport equipment   
38 Instruments and related products   
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries   
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Appendix II 
Table A.2 Harmonic Mass index; bilateral comparison of distribution functions (shaded cells are identical at 5% significance level)* 
 Benchmark Mergers & Acquisitions 
       all acquirer target 
 all AUS FRA NLD GBR USA acq tar AUS FRA NLD GBR USA AUS FRA NLD GBR USA 
benchmark                   
  All 0.000 0.343 0.127 0.093 0.118 0.153 0.319 0.300 0.155 0.348 0.186 0.317 0.387 0.174 0.263 0.179 0.323 0.386 
  AUS  0.002 0.461 0.365 0.430 0.463 0.542 0.530 0.290 0.560 0.484 0.547 0.581 0.245 0.528 0.474 0.547 0.578 
  FRA   0.002 0.175 0.094 0.075 0.266 0.247 0.271 0.291 0.140 0.251 0.336 0.295 0.187 0.125 0.253 0.336 
  NLD    0.002 0.186 0.202 0.397 0.367 0.176 0.414 0.233 0.416 0.459 0.184 0.339 0.221 0.418 0.450 
  GBR     0.002 0.082 0.241 0.224 0.269 0.272 0.097 0.224 0.333 0.287 0.159 0.104 0.233 0.335 
  USA      0.002 0.182 0.162 0.289 0.220 0.094 0.189 0.252 0.311 0.137 0.073 0.199 0.252 
M&As                   
  Acq-all       0.004 0.024 0.410 0.090 0.211 0.079 0.097 0.431 0.131 0.204 0.077 0.111 
  Tar-all        0.003 0.389 0.091 0.184 0.093 0.102 0.411 0.119 0.177 0.091 0.108 
  Acq-AUS         0.019 0.417 0.315 0.423 0.458 0.072 0.368 0.298 0.424 0.451 
  Acq-FRA          0.014 0.228 0.108 0.130 0.438 0.131 0.230 0.108 0.128 
  Acq-NLD           0.017 0.237 0.290 0.338 0.151 0.048 0.246 0.277 
  Acq-GBR            0.008 0.170 0.442 0.134 0.234 0.021 0.181 
  Acq-USA             0.012 0.483 0.188 0.277 0.170 0.029 
  Tar-AUS              0.016 0.393 0.324 0.443 0.476 
  Tar-FRA               0.012 0.153 0.137 0.191 
  Tar-NLD                0.013 0.244 0.272 
  Tar-GBR                 0.012 0.180 
  Tar-USA                  0.010 
# obs 2100 420 420 420 420 420 3462 3462 189 257 137 1446 1433 261 416 212 878 1695 
* Values in cells indicates Harmonic Mass index (exception: # obs); the solid borders indicate the most relevant comparisons, as emphasized in the main text. 
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Appendix III 
Table A.3 Poisson Count; ML/QML (standard errors in parentheses) 
  acquiring perspective target perspective 
Balassa index     
 BI 0.2730***  0.1903***  
  (0.0514)  (0.0504)  
 BIAU  0.3333***  0.2528*** 
   (0.0663)  (0.0631) 
 BIFR  0.5602***  0.0676 
   (0.2154)  (0.1886) 
 BINT  0.2637**  0.3461*** 
   (0.1210)  (0.1255) 
 BIUK  0.2323**  0.1551 
   (0.1180)  (0.1283) 
Waves     
 all-sec1 0.0040 0.0040 -0.0092 -0.0090 
  (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0088) (0.0088) 
 all-sec1+2 -0.0038 -0.0042 -0.0010 -0.0015 
  (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
 all-tot1 0.0064*** 0.0063*** 0.0102*** 0.0102*** 
  (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0019) 
 all-tot1+2 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0010 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
 co-sec1 -0.0063 -0.0063 0.0227 0.0224 
  (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0171) 
 co-sec1+2 0.0200** 0.0215** 0.0094 0.0109 
  (0.0097) (0.0096) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
 co-tot1 0.0080** 0.0080** -0.0020 -0.0020 
  (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
 co-tot1+2 -0.0057** -0.0058*** -0.0029 -0.0031 
  (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
co-sec fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -2,537 -2,535 -2,732 -2,728 
Restr log likelihood -5,815 -5,815 -5,565 -5,565 
LR statistic 6,556*** 6,560*** 5,666*** 5,675*** 
LR index (pseudo-R2) 0.564 0.564 0.509 0.510 
# observations 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300 
tot = total, co = country, sec = sector, sub-index 1 = one year ago, sub-index 1+2 = 1 and 2 years ago. 
*** = statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, and * 10% level; Huber/White st errors. 
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Appendix IV  
Table A.4 Acquiring robustness, negative binomial count; QML (parameter = 0.11) 
(standard errors in parentheses), select wave variables  
  1982 – 2000 1985 – 2004 
Balassa index     
 BI 0.2785***  0.2520***  
  (0.0575)  (0.0506)  
 BIAU  0.3528***  0.3194*** 
   (0.0731)  (0.0648) 
 BIFR  0.5031**  0.5234** 
   (0.2401)  (0.2158) 
 BINT  0.2765**  0.2276* 
   (0.1246)  (0.1256) 
 BIUK  0.1920+  0.1976* 
   (0.1252)  (0.1146) 
Waves     
 all-tot1 0.0074*** 0.0073*** 0.0047*** 0.0047*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
 co-sec1+2 0.0173*** 0.0185*** 0.0171*** 0.0183*** 
  (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0047) (0.0047) 
 co-tot1 0.0079*** 0.0080*** 0.0101*** 0.0101*** 
  (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
 co-tot1+2 -0.0062*** -0.0063*** -0.0064*** -0.0065*** 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
co-sec fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -2,055 -2,053 -2,316 -2,313 
Restr log likelihood -24,866 -24,866 -26,316 -26,316 
LR statistic 45,622*** 45,626*** 48,001*** 48,006*** 
LR index (pseudo-R2) 0.917 0.917 0.912 0.912 
# observations 1,900 1,900 2,000 2,000 
tot = total, co = country, sec = sector, sub-index 1 = one year ago, sub-index 1+2 = 1 and 2 years ago. 
*** = statistically significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, and + 15% level; Huber/White st errors. 
 
M&As: waves and comparative advantage 
© Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk, 2008 47
 
Table A.5 Target robustness, negative binomial count; QML (parameter = 0.11) 
(standard errors in parentheses), select wave variables  
  1982 – 2000 1985 – 2004 
Balassa index     
 BI 0.2010***  0.1707***  
  (0.0557)  (0.0505)  
 BIAU  0.2373***  0.2215*** 
   (0.0680)  (0.0647) 
 BIFR  0.0513  0.0020 
   (0.2089)  (0.1840) 
 BINT  0.3462***  0.3106** 
   (0.1307)  (0.1221) 
 BIUK  0.2071+  0.0901 
   (0.1351)  (0.1269) 
Waves     
 all-sec1 -0.0097*  -0.0129**  
  (0.0055)  (0.0051)  
 all-sec1+2  -0.0082***  -0.0091*** 
   (0.0030  (0.0028) 
 all-tot1 0.0092*** 0.0097*** 0.0069*** 0.0073*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
 co-sec1 0.0476***  0.0480***  
  (0.0100)  (0.0085)  
 co-sec1+2  0.0309***  0.0297*** 
   (0.0062)  (0.0053) 
 co-tot1+2 -0.0046*** -0.0052*** -0.0038*** -0.0042*** 
  (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) 0.0009 
co-sec fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -2,212 -2,209 -2,514 -2,510 
Restr log likelihood -24,717 -24,717 -26,127 -26,127 
LR statistic 45,010*** 45,017*** 47,226*** 47,233*** 
LR index (pseudo-R2) 0.910 0.911 0.904 0.904 
# observations 1,900 1,900 2,000 2,000 
tot = total, co = country, sec = sector, sub-index 1 = one year ago, sub-index 1+2 = 1 and 2 years ago. 
*** = statistically significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, and + 15% level; Huber/White st errors. 
 
